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Abstract 
Expectation is a central notion in probability the­
ory. The notion of expectation also makes sense 
for other notions of uncertainty. We introduce 
a propositional logic for reasoning about expec­
tation, where the semantics depends on the un­
derlying representation of uncertainty. We give 
sound and complete axiomatizations for the logic 
in the case that the underlying representation is 
(a) probability, (b) sets of probability measures, 
(c) belief functions, and (d) possibility measures. 
We show that this logic is more expressive than 
the corresponding logic for reasoning about like­
lihood in the case of sets of probability measures, 
but equi-expressive in the case of probability, 
belief, and possibility. Finally, we show that 
satisfiability for these logics is NP-complete, no 
harder than satisfiability for propositional logic. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important notions in probability theory 
is that of expectation. The expected value of a random 
variable is, in a sense, the single number that best describes 
the random variable. In this paper, we consider the notion 
of expectation in a more general setting. 
It is well known that a probability measure determines a 
unique expectation function that is linear (i.e., E(aX + 
bY) = aE(X) + bE(Y)), monotone (i.e., X :":: Y implies 
E(X) :":: E(Y)), and maps constant functions to their 
value. Conversely, given an expectation function E (that is, 
a function from random variables to the reals) that is linear, 
monotone, and maps constant functions to their value, there 
is a unique probability measure J.L such that E = Ew That 
is, there is a 1-1 mapping from probability measures to 
(probabilistic) expectation functions. 
Walley [1991] has argued persuasively that it is necessary 
to occasionally go beyond probabilistic expectation. He 
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introduces lower and upper previsions, which are essen­
tially lower and upper expectations with respect to sets of 
probability measures. Characterizations of the epectation 
functions that arise from sets of probability measures are 
well known [Huber 1981; Walley 1981; Walley 1991). 
However, there seems to be surprisingly little work on 
characterizing expectation in the context of other measures 
of uncertainty, such as belief functions [Shafer 1976) and 
possibility measures [Dubois and Prade 1990). We provide 
characterizations here. 
Having characterized expectation functions, we then turn 
to the problem of reasoning about them. We define a logic 
similar in spirit to that introduced in [Fagin, Halpern, and 
Megiddo 1990) (FHM from now on) for reasoning about 
likelihood expressed as either probability or belief. The 
same logic is used in [Halpern and Pucella 2001) (HP 
from now on) for reasoning about upper probabilities. The 
logic for reasoning about expectation is strictly more ex­
pressive than its counterpart for reasoning about likelihood 
if the underlying semantics is given in terms of sets of 
probability measures (so that upper probabilities and upper 
expectations are used, respectively); it turns out to be equi­
expressive in the case of probability, belief functions, and 
possibility measures. This is somewhat surprising, espe­
cially in the case of belief functions. In all cases, the fact 
that expectations are at least as expressive is immediate, 
since the expectation of rp (viewed as an indicator function, 
that is, the random variable that is 1 in worlds where rp is 
true and 0 otherwise) is equal to its likelihood. However, it 
is not always obvious how to express the expectation of a 
random variable in terms of likelihood. 
We then provide a sound and complete axiomatization for 
the logic with respect to each of the interpretations of 
expectation that we consider, using our characterization of 
expectation. Finally, we show that, just as in the case of 
the corresponding logic for reasoning about likelihood, the 
complexity of the satisfiability problem is NP-complete. 
This is clear when the underlying semantics is given in 
terms of probability measures, belief functions, or possi­
bility measures, but it is perhaps surprising that, despite 
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the added expressiveness in the case of sets of probability 
measures, reasoning in the logic remains NP-complete. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one previous 
attempt to express properties of expectation in a logical 
setting. Wilson and Moral [1994] takes as their starting 
point Walley's notion of lower and upper previsions. They 
consider when acceptance of one set of gambles implies 
acceptance of another gamble. This is a notion that is easily 
expressible in our logic when the original set of gambles is 
finite, so our logic subsumes theirs in the finite case. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the 
characterizations of expectation for probability measures 
and sets of probability measures are reviewed, and the char­
acterizations of expectation for belief functions and possi­
bility measures are provided. In Section 3, we introduce 
a logic for reasoning about expectation with respect to all 
these representations of uncertainty. In Section 4, we com­
pare the expressive power of our expectation logic to that 
of the logic for reasoning about likelihood. In Section 5, 
we derive sound and complete axiomatizations for the logic 
in Section 3, with respect to different representations of 
uncertainty. In Section 6, we discuss an axiomatization of 
gamble inequalities, which is assumed by the axiomatiza­
tions given in Section 5. Finally, in Section 7, we prove 
that the decision problem for the expectation logic is NP­
complete for each of the representations of uncertainty we 
consider. Due to lack of space, proofs are left to the full 
paper. 
2 EXPECTATION FUNCTIONS 
Recall that a random variable X on a sample space (set of 
possible worlds) W is a function from W to some range. 
Let V(X) denote the image of X, that is, the possible val­
ues of X. A gamble is a random variable whose range is the 
reals. In this paper, we focus on the expectation of gambles; 
we consider only,gambles X such that V(X) is finite. (This 
allows us to define expectation using summation rather than 
integration.) 
2.1 EXPECTATION FOR PROBABILITY 
MEASURES 
Given a probability measure f.! and a gamble X, the ex­
pected value of X (or the expectation of X) with respect to 
f.!, denoted E"(X), is just 
EI'(X) = L XJ..t(X = x) . (1) 
xEV(X) 
This definition implicitly assumes that the gamble X is 
measurable, that is, for each value x E V(X), the set of 
worlds X = x where X takes on value x is measurable. 
As is well known, probabilistic expectation functions can 
be characterized by a small collection of properties. If X 
and Y are gambles on W and a and b are real numbers, 
define the gamble aX + bY on W in the obvious way: 
(aX+ bY)(w) = aX(w) + bY(w). Say that X ::; Y 
if X ( w) ::; Y ( w) for all w E W. Let c denote the constant 
function which always returns c; that is, c( w) = c. Let f.! 
be a probability measure on W. 
Proposition 2.1: The function E" has the following prop­
erties for all measurable gambles X and Y. 
(a) E" is additive: E"(X + Y) = E"(X) + E"(Y). 
(b) E" is affinely homogeneous: E"(aX + b) 
aE"(X) + bfor all a,b E R 
(c) E" is monotone: if X::; Y, then E"(X)::; E"(Y). 
The next result shows that the properties in Proposition 2.1 
essentially characterize probabilistic expectation functions. 
It too is well known. 
Theorem 2.2: Suppose that E maps gambles measurable 
with respect to some algebra :F to JR. and E is additive, 
affinely homogeneous, and monotone. Then there is a 
(necessarily unique) probability measure f.! on :F such that 
E = Ew 
2.2 EXPECTATION FOR SETS OF PROBABILITY 
MEASURES 
If P is a set of probability measures on a space W, define 
P.(U) = inf{J..t(U): f.! E P} and 
P*(U) = sup{J..t(U): J..t E P}. 
P. (U) is called the lower probability of U and P* (U) 
is called the upper probability of U. Lower and upper 
probabilities have been well studied in the literature (see, 
for example, [Borel 1943; Smith 1961]). 
There are straightforward analogues of lower and upper 
probability in the context of expectation. If P is a set 
of probability measures such that X is measurable with 
respect to each probability measure f.! E P, then define 
Ep(X) = {EI'(X): f.! E P} . Ep(X) is a set of numbers. 
Define the lower expectation and upper expectation of X 
with respect toP, denoted Ep(X) and Ep(X), as the inf 
and sup of the set Ep(X), respectively. 
The properties of Ep and Ep are not so different from 
those of probabilistic expectation functions. Let Xu denote 
the gamble such that Xu(w) = 1 if w E U and Xu(w) = 
0 if w ¢; U. A gamble of the form Xu is traditionally 
called an indicator function. Note that E"(Xu) = J..t(U). 
Similarly, it is easy to see that P.(U) = Ep(Xu) and 
P*(U) = Ep(Xu). Moreover, we have the following 
analogue of Propositions 2.1. 
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Proposition 2.3: The functions Ep and Ep have the fol­
lowing properties for all gambles X andY. 
(a) Ep(X + Y) 2: Ep(X) + Ep(Y) (superadditivity); 
Ep(X + Y) :<::: Ep(X) + Ep(Y) (subadditivity). 
(b) Ep and Ep are both positively affinely homoge­
neous: fJ.p(aX +b) = afJ.p(X) + band Ep(aX + 
b)= aEp(X) + bifa,b E lR, a 2: 0. 
(c) Ep and Ep are monotone. 
(d) Ep(X) = -Ep( -X). 
Superadditivity (resp., subadditivity), positive affine homo­
geneity, and monotonicity in fact characterize fJ.p (resp., 
Ep). 
Theorem 2.4: [Huber 1981] Suppose that E maps gambles 
measurable with respect to F to lR and is superadditive 
(resp., subadditive), positively affinely homogeneous, and 
monotone. Then there is a set P of probability measures on - l F such that E = Ep (resp., E = Ep). 
The set P constructed in Theorem 2.4 is not unique. It 
is not hard to construct sets P and P' such that P i' P' 
but Ep = Ep.. However, there is a canonical largest 
set P such that E = Ep; P consists of all probability 
measures J.L such that EI'(X) 2: E(X) for all gambles X. 
This set P can be shown to be closed and convex. Indeed, 
it easily follows that Theorem 2.4 actually provides a 1-1 
mapping from closed, convex sets of probability measures 
to lower/upper expectations. Moreover, in a precise sense, 
this is the best we can do. If P and P' have the same convex 
closure (where the convex closure of a set is the smallest 
closed, convex set containing it), then Ep = Ep,. 
As Walley [ 1991] shows, what he calls coherent 
lower/upper previsions are also lower/upper expectations 
with respect to some set of probability measures. Thus, 
lower/upper previsions can be identified with closed, con­
vex sets of probability measures. 
2.3 EXPECTATION FOR BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
As is well known, a belief function [Shafer 1976] Bel is a 
function from subsets of a state space W to [0, 1] satisfying 
the following three properties: 
B 1. Bel(0) = 0. 
B2. Bel(W) = 1. 
1There is an equivalent characterization of fl.'P, due to Walley 
[1991]. He shows that E == E.'P for some set P of probability 
measures iff E is superadditive, E(cX) = cE(X), and E(X) 2: 
inf {X ( w) : w E W}. An analogous characterization holds for 
E'P. 
B3. For n = 1, 2, 3, . . .  , Bel(U�1 Ui) 2: 
2:::�=1 Lp<;;{l, .. ,n}VI=i} ( -l)i+tBel(niEI Uj)· 
Given a belief function Bel, there is a corresponding plau­
sibility function Plaus, where Plaus(U) = 1 - Bel(U). 
It follows easily from B3 that Bel(U) :<::: Plaus(U) for all 
U � W. Bel(U) can be thought of as a lower bound of a 
set of probabilities and Plaus(U) can be thought of as the 
corresponding upper bound. This intuition is made precise 
in the following well-known result. 
Theorem 2.5: [Dempster 1967] Given a belief function Bel 
defined on W, let PBel = {J.L : p.(U) 2: Bel(U) for all U � 
W}. Then Bel = (PBeJ) 
•. 
There is an obvious way to define a notion of expectation 
based on belief functions, using the identification of Bel 
with (PBei) •. Given a belief function Bel, define EBel == 
f1p8,1• Similarly, for the corresponding plausibility func­
tion Plaus, define EPtaus = Ep8,1• (These definitions are 
in fact used by Dempster [1967]). 
This is well defined, but it seems more natural to get a 
notion of expectation for belief functions that is defined 
purely in terms of belief functions, without reverting to 
probability. One way of doing so is due to Choquet 
[1953].2 It takes as its point of departure the following 
alternate definition of expectation in the case of probability. 
Suppose X is a gamble such that V(X) = {x1, ... ,xn}, 
with x1 < . . .  < Xn. 
Proposition 2.6: Ep.(X) = x1 + (x2 - xl)p.(X > xi)+ 
· · · + (xn- Xn-l)J.L(X > Xn-d · 
Define 
Ek.1(X) = X1 + (x2- xl)Bel(X > x1)+ 
· · · + (xn- Xn-l )Bei (X > Xn-1 ) · 
An analogous definition holds for plausibility: 
E�laus(X) = X1 + (x2- xl)Plaus(X > x1)+ 
· · · + (xn - Xn-l)Plaus(X > Xn-1)· 
(2) 
(3) 
Proposition 2.7: [Schmeidler 1989] Esel = Ekel and 
EPtaus = E�laus· 
Thus, using (2), there is a way of defining expectation for 
belief functions without referring to probability. 
Since EBel can be viewed as a special case of the lower 
expectation fJ.p (taking P == Paet), it is immediate 
from Proposition 2.3 that EBel is superadditive, positively 
affinely homogeneous, and monotone. (Similar remarks 
2Choquet actually talked about k-monotone capacities, which 
are essentially functions that satisfy B3 where n = 1, . . . , k. 
Belief functions are essentially equivalent to infinitely monotone 
capacities. 
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hold for EPiaus. except that it is subadditive. For ease 
of exposition, we focus on EBel in the remainder of this 
section, although analogous remarks hold for EP!aus·l But 
EBei has additional properties. 
Since it is immediate from the definition that EBei(Xu) = 
Bel(U) , the inclusion-exclusion property B3 of belief func­
tions can be expressed in terms of expectation (just by 
replacing all instances of Bel(V) in B3 by EBei(Xv )). 
Moreover, it does not follow from the other properties, 
since it can be shown not to hold for arbitrary lower proba­
bilities. B3 seems like a rather specialized property, since it 
applies only to indicator functions. There is a more general 
version of it that also holds for EBel· Given gambles X 
and Y, define the gambles X /\ Y and X V Y as the 
minimum and maximum of X andY, respectively; that is, 
(X/\ Y)(w) = min(X(w) , Y(w)) and (X V Y)(w) = 
max( X ( w), Y ( w)) .  Consider the following inclusion­
exclusion rule for expectation functions: 
E(Vi=1X;) 2': 
2::7=1 I:{Ic;;{l,. ,n}l l=i}(-l)
i
+lE(IIjEIXj)· 
(4) 
Since it is immediate that Xuuv = XuV X v and Xunv = 
Xu/\ Xv, (4) generalizes B3. 
There is yet another property satisfied by expectation func­
tions based on belief functions. It too is expressed in 
terms of indicator functions; we do not know if there is 
a generalization that holds for arbitrary gambles. 
IfU1 :2 U2 :2 . . . :2 Un anda1, ... ,an 2': 0 
then E(a 1Xu, +···+an Xu.) = 
a1E(Xu,) + · · · + anE(XuJ. 
(5) 
Proposition 2.8: The function EBei is superadditive, pos­
itively affinely homogeneous, monotone, and satisfies (4) 
and (5). 
Theorem 2.9: Suppose that E is an expectation function 
that is positively affinely homogeneous, monotone, and 
satisfies (4) and (5). Then there is a (necessarily unique) 
belief function Bel such that E = EBel· 
Note that superadditivity was not assumed in the statement 
of Theorem 2.9. This suggests that superadditivity follows 
from the other properties. This is indeed the case. 
Proposition 2.10: An expectation function that satisfies (4) 
and (5) is superadditive. 
It follows easily from these results that EBei is the unique 
expectation function E that .is superadditive, positively 
affinely homogeneous, monotone, and satisfies (4) and (5) 
such that E(Xu) = Bel(U) for all U � W. Propo­
sition 2.8 shows that EBel has these properties. If E' 
is an expectation function that has these properties, by 
Theorem 2.9, E' = EBel' for some belief function Bel'. 
Since E'(Xu) = Bel' (U) = Bel(U) for all U � W, it 
follows that Bel = Bel'. 
This is somewhat surprising. While it is almost immediate 
that an additive, affinely homogeneous expectation func­
tion (the type that arises from a probability measure) is 
determined by its behavior on indicator functions, it is not 
at all obvious that a superadditive, positively affine homo­
geneous expectation function should be determ.ined by its 
behavior on indicator functions. In fact, in general it is not, 
as the following example shows. The inclusion-exclusion 
property is essential. This observation says that Bel and 
EBei contain the same information. Thus, so do (PBei)• 
and Ep8,1 (since Bel= (PBei)• and EBei = Ep8,1). How­
ever, this is not true for arbitrary sets P of probability mea­
sures, as the following example shows. Let W = {1, 2, 3}. 
A probability measure f.J, on W can be characterized by 
a triple (a1, a2, a3), where f.l(i) = a;. Let P consist of 
the three probability measures (0, 3/8, 5/8), (5/8, 0, 3/8), 
and (3/8, 5/8, 0). It is almost immediate that P. is 0 
on singleton subsets of W and P. = 3/8 for doubleton 
subsets. Let P' = P U {f.l4}, where f.J,4 = (5/8, 3/8, 0). 
It is easy to check that P� = P •. However, Ep =I /ip•. 
In particular, let X be the gamble such that X ( 1) = 1, 
X(2) = 2, and X(3) = 3. Then /ip(X) = 13/8 but 
Ep,(X) = 11/8. Thus, although Ep and Ep, agree on 
indicator functions, they do not agree on all gambles. In 
light of the discussion above, it should be no surprise that 
P. is not a belief function. 
2.4 EXPECTATION FOR POSSIBILITY 
MEASURES 
A possibility measure Poss is a function from subsets of W 
to [0, 1] such that 
Possl .  Poss(0) = 0. 
Poss2. Poss (W) = 1. 
Poss3. Poss(U; U;) = sup; Poss(U;). 
It is well known [Dubois and Prade 1982] that a possi­
bility measures are special cases of plausibility functions. 
Thus, (3) can be used to define a notion of possibilistic 
expectation; indeed, this has been done in the literature 
[Dubois and Prade 1987]. It is immediate from Poss3 that 
the expectation function Ep088 defined from a possibility 
measure Poss in this way satisfies the sup property: 
EPoss(Xu,uJ = max(EPoss(Xu.)). (6) 
Proposition 2.11: The function E?oss is positively affinely 
homogeneous, monotone, and satisfies (5) and (6). 
Theorem 2.12: Suppose that E is an expectation function 
that is positively affinely homogeneous, monotone, and 
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satisfies (5) and (6). Then there is a (necessarily unique) 
possibility measure Pass such that E = Ep055• 
Note that, although Pass is a plausibility measure, and 
thus satisfies the analogue of ( 4) with 2: replaced by ::; , 
there is no need to state (4) explicitly; it follows from (6). 
Moreover, just as in Lemma 2.10, it follows from the other 
properties that Ep055 is subadditive. (Since a possibility 
measure is a plausibility function, not a belief function, the 
corresponding expectation function is subadditive rather 
than superadditive.) 
3 A LOGIC FOR REASONING ABOU T 
EXPECTATION 
We now consider a logic for reasoning about expectation. 
To set the stage, we briefly review the FHM logic for 
reasoning about likelihood. 
3.1 REASONING ABOUT LIKELIHOOD 
The syntax of the FHM logic is straightforward. Fix a 
set <Po = {Pl, P2, . .. } of primitive propositions. The set 
<I> of propositional formulas is the closure of <Po under 
II and �. We assume a special propositional formula 
true, and abbreviate �true as false. A basic likelihood 
formula has the form a1l( cpl) + · · · + akl( 'Pk) 2: b, 
where a1, ... , ak, b are real numbers and 'Pl, ... , 'Pk are 
propositional formulas. The l stands for likelihood. Thus, 
a basic likelihood formula talks about a linear combination 
of likelihood terms of the form l; ( cp). A likelihood formula 
is a Boolean combination of basic likelihood formulas. Let 
.CQU be the language consisting of likelihood formulas. 
(The QU stands for quantitative uncertainty. The name for 
the logic is taken from [Halpern 2002].) 
Although a likelihood formula involves 2:, it is easy to 
define similar expressions with ::;, =, >. and <,using the 
logical operators. For example, a1l( cp1) + · · · +akl( 'Pk) ::; 
b is an abbreviation for -a1€(cp1) - · · ·- akl(cpk) 2: -b. 
Using::; and 2: gives us=; then > can be obtained from 2: 
and =, using negation. 
The semantics of .cQu depends on how l is interpreted. In 
FHM, it is interpreted as a probability measure and as a 
belief function; in HP, it is interpreted as an upper proba­
bility (determined by a set of probability measures). Thus, 
£( cp) is taken as the probability of cp (i.e., more precisely, 
the probability of the set of worlds where cp is true), the 
belief in cp, etc. For example, in the case of probability, 
define a probability structure to be a tuple M = ( W , fi-, 1r ), 
where /1- is a probability on W3 and 1r is an interpretation, 
which associates with each state (or world) in W a truth 
assignment on the primitive propositions in <P0. Thus, 
1r(s)(p) E {true, false} for s E Wand p E <P0. Extend 
3For simplicity here, we assume that all sets are measurable. 
1r( s) to a truth assignment on all propositional formulas 
in the standard way, and associate with each propositional 
formula the set ['P]M = {s E W : 1r(s)(cp) =true}. 
Then 
M F a1l(',Ol) + · · · + anf(cpn) 2: b iff 
alfJ-([cp!)M) + · · · + anfl-([cpn]M) 2: b. 
The semantics of Boolean combinations of basic likelihood 
formulas is given in the obvious way. 
We can similarly give semantics to l using lower (or upper) 
probability. Define a lower probability structure to be a 
tuple M = ( W, P, 1r), W and 1r are, as before, a set of 
worlds and an interpretation, and P is a set of probability 
measures. Likelihood is interpreted as lower probability in 
lower probability structures:4 
M F a1l(cp1) + · · · + anl(cpn) 2: b iff 
a1 P. ([cpl]M) + ···+ an P. ([cpn]M) 2: b. 
A belief structure has the form M = (W, Bel , 1r), where 
Bel is a belief function. We can interpret likelihood 
formulas with respect to belief structures in the obvious 
way. Similarly, a possibility structure has the form M = 
(W, Poss, 1r ), where Poss is a possibility measure. Again, 
we interpret likelihood formulas with respect to possibility 
structures in the obvious way. 
Let M prob, M lp, M bel, and M poss denote the set of all 
probability structures, lower probability structures, belief 
structures, and possibility structures, respectively. 
3.2 REASONING ABOUT EXPECTATION 
Our logic for reasoning about expectation is similar in spirit 
to .cQu. The idea is to interpret a propositional formula cp 
as the indicator function X[.,]M• which is I in worlds where 
cp is true, and 0 otherwise. We can then take linear combi­
nations of such gambles. A (linear) propositional gamble is 
a linear combination of propositional formulas, of the form 
b1<p1 +· · ·+bn'Pn· where b1, ... , bn are reals. We use 1' to 
represent propositional gambles. An expectation inequality 
is a statement of the form a1e(1'1) + · · · + ake(l'k) 2: b, 
where a1 ... , ak are reals, k 2: 1, and b is a real. An 
expectation formula is a Boolean combination of expecta­
tion inequalities. We use f and g to represent expectation 
formulas. We use obvious abbreviations where needed, 
such as e('Y1)- e('Y2) 2: a for e('Yl) + ( -l)e('Y2) 2: a, 
e(1'1) 2: e(1'2) for e(l'l) - e(/'2) 2: 0, e(l') ::; a for 
-e('Y) 2: -a, e('Y) < a for -,(e('Y) 2: a) and e('Y) = a 
for (e('Y) 2: a) II (e('Y) ::; a). Let .CE be the language 
consisting of expectation formulas. 
4ln HP, we interpreted likelihood as upper probability. We 
interpret it here as lower probability to bring out the connections 
to belief, which is an instance of lower probability. It is easy to 
translate from upper probabilities to lower probabilities and vice 
versa, since P. (U) = 1- P" (iJ). 
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Given a model M, we associate with a propositional gam­
ble 1 the gamble {II�M· where �b1'P1 + · · · + bn'Pn�M = 
blX['P,[M + · · · + bnX['PnlM· Of course, the intention is 
to interpret e(l) in M as the expected value of the gam­
ble ��� M, where the notion of "expected value" depends 
on the underlying semantics. In the case of probability 
structures, it is probabilistic expectation; in the case of 
belief structures, it is expected belief; in the case of lower 
probability structures, it is lower expectation; and so on. 
For example, if M E Mprob, then 
M I= a1e(II) + · · · + ake(!k )  � b iff 
a1E�"({I11�M) + · · · + akEJL(�/k�M) � b. 
Again, Boolean combinations are defined in the obvious 
way. We leave the obvious semantic definitions in the case 
of belief structures and lower probability structures to the 
reader. 
4 EXPRESSIVE POWER 
It is easy to see that LE is at least as expressive as LQU. 
Since the expected value of an indicator function is its 
likelihood, for all the notions of likelihood we are con­
sidering, replacing all occurrences of £( <p) in a formula in 
LQU by e(<p) gives an equivalent formula in LE. Is [_E 
strictly more expressive than £_QU? That depends on the 
underlying semantics. 
In the case of probability, it is easy to see that it is not. 
Using additivity and affine homogeneity, it is easy to take 
an arbitrary formula I E LE and find a formula f' E LE 
that is equivalent to I (with respect to structures in Mprob) 
such that e is applied only to propositional formulas. Then 
using the equivalence of e( <p) and £( <p ), we can find a for­
mula IT E £_QU equivalent to I with respect to structures 
in M prob. It should be clear that the translation I to IT 
causes at most a linear blowup in the size of the formula. 
The same is true if we interpret formulas with respect to 
M bel and M poss. In both cases, given a formula I E L E, 
we can use (5) to find a formula f' E LE equivalent to I 
such that e is applied only to propositional formulas. (The 
details are in the full paper.) It is then easy to find a formula 
IT E £_QU equivalent to f' with respect to structures in 
M bel and Mposs. However, now the translation from I 
to IT can cause an exponential blowup in the size of the 
formula. 
What about lower expectation/probability? In this case, 
[_E is strictly more expressive than £_QU, It is not hard to 
construct two structures in M 1P that agree on all formulas 
in LQu but disagree on formulas in LE such as e(p + q) > 
1/2. That means that there cannot be a formula in £_QU 
equivalent to e(p + q) > 1/2. 
The following theorem summarizes this discussion. 
Theorem 4.1: LE and £_QU are equivalent in expressive 
power with respect to Mprob, M bel, and Mposs. [_E is 
strictly more expressive than £_QU with respect to M1P. 
5 AXIOMATIZING EXPECTATION 
In FHM, a sound and complete axiomatization is provided 
for LQU both with respect to Mprob and Mbel; in HP, a 
sound and complete axiomatization is provided for £_QU 
with respect to M1P. Here we provide a sound and com­
plete axiomatization for LE with respect to these struc­
tures. 
The axiomatization for £_QU given in FHM splits into three 
parts, dealing respectively with propositional reasoning, 
reasoning about linear inequalities, and reasoning about 
likelihood. We follow the same pattern here. The following 
axioms characterize propositional reasoning: 
Taut. All instances of propositional tautologies in the 
language LE. 
MP. From I and I=} g infer g. 
Instances of Taut include aJI formulas of the form IV •I, 
where I is an expectation formula. We could replace Taut 
by a simple collection of axioms that characterize propo­
sitional reasoning (see, for example, [Mendelson 1964]), 
but we have chosen to focus on aspects of reasoning about 
expectations. 
The following axiom characterizes reasoning about linear 
inequalities: 
Ineq. All instances in LE of valid formulas about 
linear inequalities 
This axiom is taken from FHM. There, an inequality for­
mula is taken to be a Boolean combination of formulas of 
the forma1x1+···+anxn � c,over variablesx1, ... ,xn . 
Such a formula is valid if the resulting inequality holds un­
der every possible assignment of real numbers to variables. 
To get an instance of Ineq, we replace each variable x; 
that occurs in a valid formula about linear inequalities by 
a primitive expectation term of the form e(li) (naturally 
each occurrence of the variable Xi must be replaced by the 
same primitive expectation term e(l;)). As with Taut, we 
can replace Ineq by a sound and complete axiomatization 
for Boolean combinations of linear inequalities. One such 
axiomatization is given in FHM. 
The following axioms characterize probabilistic expecta­
tion in terms of the properties described in Proposition 2.1. 
El. e(l1 + 12) = e(IJ) + e(lz), 
E2. e(a<p) = ae(<p) for all a E lR, 
-; 
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E3. e(jalse) = 0, 
E4. e(true) = 1, 
E5 e(/1) ::; e(/2) if 11 ::; 12 is an instance of a 
valid formula about propositional gamble inequality 
(see below). 
Axiom El is simply additivity of expectations. Axioms 
E2, E3, and E4, in conjunction with additivity, capture 
affine homogeneity. Axiom E5 captures monotonicity. A 
propositional gamble inequality is a formula of the form 
11 ::; /2· where 11 and /2 are propositional gambles. 
Examples of valid propositional gamble inequalities are 
p = p 1\ q + p 1\ �q, r.p ::; r.p + 'lj!, and r.p ::; r.p V 'lj!. We 
define the semantics of gamble inequalities more carefully 
in Section 6, where we provide a complete axiomatization 
for them. As in the case of Ineq, we can replace E5 by a 
sound and complete axiomatization for Boolean combina­
tions of gamble inequalities. 5 
Let AXprob be the axiomatization 
{Taut, MP, Ineq, El, E2, E3, E4, E5}. As usual, given an 
axiom system AX, we say that a formula f is AX-provable 
if it can be proved using the axioms and rules of inferences 
of AX. AX is sound with respect to a class M of structures 
if every AX-provable formula is valid in M.  AX is is 
complete with respect to M if every formula that is valid 
in M is AX-provable. 
Theorem 5.1: Arrob is a sound and complete axiomati­
zation of£ E with respect to M prob. 
The characterizations of Theorems 2.4 and 2.9 suggest the 
appropriate axioms for reasoning about lower expectations 
and expected beliefs. 
The following axioms capture the properties specified in 
Proposition 2.3: 
E6. e(/1 + /2) � e(/1) + e(/2), 
E7. e(a1 + b true) = ae(!) + b, for all a, b E lR, 
a � 0, 
E8. e(a1 + bfalse) = ae(!), for all a, b E  lR, a �  0. 
Axiom E6 is superadditivity of the expectation. Axioms 
E7 and E8 capture positive affine homogeneity. Note 
that because we do not have additivity, we cannot get 
away with simpler axioms as in the case of probability. 
5We could have taken a more complex language that contains 
both expectation formulas and gamble inequalities. We could then 
merge the axiomatizations for expectation formulas and gamble 
inequalities. For simplicity, and to clarify the relationship be­
tween reasoning about expectation versus reasoning about like­
lihood (see Section 4), we consider only the restricted language 
in this paper. 
Monotonicity is captured, as in the case of probability 
measures, by axiom E5. Let AX1P be the axiomatization 
{Taut, MP, Ineq, E5, E6, E7, ES}. 
Theorem 5.2: AX1P is a sound and complete axiomatiza­
tion of £E with respect to M1P. 
Although it would seem that Theorem 5.2 should follow 
easily from Proposition 2.3, this is, unfortunately, not the 
case. As usual, soundness is straightforward, and to prove 
completeness, it suffices to show that if a formula f is 
consistent with AX1P, it is satisfiable in a structure in M1P. 
Indeed, it suffices to consider formulas f that are conjunc­
tions of expectation inequalities and their negations. How­
ever, the usual approach for proving completeness in modal 
logic, which involves considering maximal consistent sets 
and canonical structures does not work. The problem is 
that there are maximal consistent sets of formulas that are 
not satisfiable. For example, there is a maximal consistent 
set of formulas that includes e(p) > 0 and e(p) ::; 1/n 
for n = 1, 2, ... ; this is clearly unsatisfiable. A similar 
problem arises in the completeness proofs for J:_QU given 
in FHM and HP, but the techniques used there do not seem 
to suffice for dealing with expectations. 
Of course, it is the case that any expectation function that 
satisfies the constraints in the formula f and also every 
instance of axioms E6, E7, and ES must be a lower expec­
tation, by Theorem 2.4. The problem is that, a priori, there 
are infinitely many relevant instances of the axioms. To 
get completeness, we must reduce this to a finite number of 
instances of these axioms. It turns out that this can be done, 
using techniques from linear programming and Walley's 
[ 1991] notion of natural extension. We leave the (quite 
nontrivial!) details to the full paper. 
It is also worth noting that, although £E is a more ex­
pressive language than J:_QU in the case of lower proba­
bility/expectation, the axiomatization for £E in this case is 
much more elegant than the corresponding axiomatization 
for J:_QU given in HP. 
We next consider expectation with respect to belief. As 
expected, the axioms capturing the interpretation of belief 
expectation rely on the properties pointed out in Propo­
sition 2.8. Stating these properties in the logic requires 
a way to express the max and min of two propositional 
gambles. It turns out that we can view the notation 11 v 12 
as an abbreviation for a more complex expression. Given a 
propositional gamble 1 = b1 r.p 1 + 
· · · + bn 'Pn• we construct 
an equivalent gamble 1' as follows. First define a family 
PA of propositional formulas indexed by A� {1, . . .  , n} 
by taking PA = 1\iEA 'Pi 1\ (1\{j�A �r.pj ) · Thus, PAis true 
exactly if the r.p;'s fori E A are true, and the other r.pj's are 
false. Note that the formulas PA are mutually exclusive. 
Define the real numbers b A for A � { 1, . . .  , n} by by 
taking bA = LiE A bi. Define /1 = LA<;;{1, ... ,n} bAP A · 
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It is easy to check that the propositional gambles 1 and 1' 
are equal. Given two propositional gambles, say /I and 12, 
we can assume without loss of generality that the involve 
the same primitive propositions cp1, ... , 'Pn. (If not, we 
can always add "dummy" terms of the form 01/J.) Form 
the gambles �� and �� as above. Since all the formulas 
mentioned in �� and�� are mutually exclusive, it it follows 
that max(!�, 1�) = l:A<;;{I, ... ,n} max(bA, bA)PA· We 
take 11 V 12 to be an abbreviation for this gamble. (Note 
that if II and 12 are the propoisitional formulas cp1 and cp2, 
respectively, then, II V 12 really is a gamble equivalent to 
the propositional formula /I V12. so the use of Vis justified 
here.) Of course, we can similarly define II 1112. simply 
by taking min instead of max. 
With these definitions, the following axioms account for 
properties (4) and (5): 
E9. e(/1 V ... V!n) = 
2:�=1 l:{I<;;{I, ... ,n}VI=i} ( -l)i+
le(/\jEI /j ). 
ElO. e(bi'PI +· · ·+bn'Pn) = b1e(cp!)+· · ·+bne(cpn) 
if 'Pn =} 'Pn-J, .. ·, '/)3 =} <p2, 'P2 =;>'PI are proposi­
tional tautologies. 
Let AXbel be the axiomatization 
{Taut, MP, Ineq, E5, E7, ES, E9, ElO}. 
Theorem 5.3: AXbel is a sound and complete a.xiomatiza­
tion of .C E with respect to M bel. 
Finally, we consider expectation with respect to possibility. 
The axioms capturing the interpretation of possibilistic ex­
pectation EPoss rely on the properties pointed out in Propo­
sition 2.1 1. The following axiom accounts for property (6): 
Ell is really a finitary version of (6); it essentially says that 
e(cp1 V 'P2) = max(e(cpJ), e(cp2)). This finitary version 
turns out to suffice for completeness 
Let AXposs be the axiomatization 
{Taut, MP, Ineq, E5, E7, ES, ElO, Ell}. 
Theorem 5.4: AXposs is a sound and complete a.xiomati­
zation of .C E with respect to M poss. 
6 REASONING ABOUT GAMBLE 
INEQUALITIES 
The axiomatization of Section 3 relied on an axiomatiza­
tion of gamble inequalities. In this section, we provide such 
an axiomatization. 
Let .C9 consist of all Boolean combinations of gamble 
inequalities /I 2': 12, where II and 12 are propositional 
gambles, as defined in Section 3. We use obvious abbrevi­
ations when needed, as in Section 3. 
We can assign a semantics to gamble formulas by consid­
ering structure M = ( W, 7!') where W is a set of worlds 
and 7l' associates with each world in W a truth assignment 
on the primitive propositions. Let M 9 be the class all 
such structures. (Clearly, every model in Mprob, M1P, 
Mbel, and MP088 can be interpreted as a model in M9, 
by simply "forgetting" the uncertainty measure over the 
worlds.) Then 
M F /I :::: /2 iff 
for all wE W, ����M(w) 2': ��2�M(w) . 
Again, Boolean combinations are given semantics in the 
obvious way. 
We can axiomatize this logic as follows. As before, we 
have Taut, MP, and lneq (although now we consider the 
instances of valid propositional tautologies and valid in­
equality formulas in the language £9). We then need only 
two more axioms to get a complete axiomatization. They 
correspond to the following two properties of indicator 
functions: for anyw E W, Xu(w) +Xv(w) = Xuuv(w) 
if U n V = 0, and Xu(w)::; Xv(w) if U � V. 
G 1. <p V 1/J = cp + 1/J if <p 111/J {?false is a propositional 
tautology, 
G2. cp ::; 1/J if cp :;. 1/J is a propositional tautology. 
Let AX9 be the axiomatization {Taut, MP, Ineq, Gl, G2}. 
Theorem 6.1: AX9 is a sound and complete a.xiomatiza­
tion of .C9 with respect to M 9. 
7 DECISION PROCEDURES 
In FHM, it was shown that the satisfiability problem for 
_cQU was NP-complete, both with respect to Mprob and 
Mb•1; in HP, NP-completeness was also shown with re­
spect to M lp. Here we prove similar results for the lan­
guage .C E. In the case of M prob, this is not at all surprising, 
given Theorem 4.1 and the fact that the translation from _cE 
to _cQU causes only a linear blowup in the case of Mprob. 
However, we cannot get the result for Mbel or Mposs from 
Theorem 4.1, since the translation causes an exponential 
blowup. Of course, in the case of M lp, no translation 
exists at all. Nevertheless, in all these cases, we can get 
NP-completeness using techniques very much in the spirit 
of the linear programming techniques used in FHM. 
Note that if we allow real numbers as coefficients in expec­
tation formulas, we have to carefully discuss the issue of 
representation of such numbers. To avoid these complica­
tions, we restrict .C E in this section to allow only integer 
coefficients. (Similar restrictions are also made in FHM 
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and HP when dealing with complexity issues.) Let .Cf 
be the resulting language. We can still express rational 
coefficients in .Cf by the standard trick of "clearing the 
denominator". 
Theorem 7.1: The problem of deciding whether a formula 
in .Cf is satisfiable in Mprob (resp. , M1P, Mb•1, MP0") 
is NP-complete. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the logic for reasoning about gam­
ble inequalities discussed in Section 6 is also NP-complete. 
Theorem 7.2: The problem of deciding whether a formula 
of £9 is satisfiable in MY is NP-complete. 
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